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FEDERAL COURTS-Ex FOR FEDERAL ANTICIPATORY RELIEF IN STATE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGs-Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
In the fall of 1970, plaintiff Richard Steffel participated in the dis-
tribution of anti-war leaflets at a shopping center in De Kalb, Georgia.
Under threat of arrest from police officers who had been summoned
by the shopping center management, he and his companions dis-
persed. Two days later, however, Steffel and Sandra Lee Becker, an-
other member of the group, returned to the center and resumed hand-
billing. Police again threatened them with arrest. Although Steffel
departed, his companion Becker remained. The police arrested her for
criminal trespass.1 Steffel subsequently invoked the Civil Rights Act2
and sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief3 in federal
court arguing that because he had desired to return to the shopping
center to distribute handbills, but had not done so because he feared
arrest, the Georgia criminal trespass statute violated his constitutional
rights under the first and fourteenth amendments.4 The district court
denied relief;5 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.6 On
certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. Held: Where no
state criminal proceeding is pending at the time a federal complaint is
1. Becker was charged with violation of GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1503 (1972), which
provides in pertinent part: "(b) A person commits criminal trespass when he know-
ingly and without authority ... (3) Remains upon the land or premises of another
person . . . after receiving notice from the owner or rightful occupant to depart. (c)
A person convicted of criminal trespass shall be punished as for a misdemeanor."
Defendant's prosecution was stayed until a final determination on the merits of Stef-
fel's challenge to the statute could be made.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The Act provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity or
other proper proceeding for redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) vests original jurisdiction in federal district courts to re-
dress such alleged deprivations. Notably, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ § 2201-02 (1970), does not itself grant jurisdiction to the federal courts.
3. On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, plaintiff Steffel
abandoned his claim for injunctive relief. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 456 n.6
(1974).
4. The complaint was originally filed as a class action naming as plaintiffs: Steffel,
suing through his father because he was a mihor; Sandra Lee Becker, who had been
arrested and who also sued through her father as a minor; and the Atlanta Mobiliza-
tion Committee. Only Steffel appealed the district court's denial of all relief. Id. at
456 n.5.
5. Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
6. Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, reh. denied, 463 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972).
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filed, the plaintiff is entitled to a declaratory judgment if he can show
that there is a genuine threat of prosecution under a state statute alleg-
edly unconstitutional either on its face or as applied. Steffel v.
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
The problem of securing anticipatory relief 7 in federal court from
the enforcement of allegedly unconstitutional state statutes has been
the subject of a long-standing jurisprudential struggle. Under the stan-
dards that have developed, not only must a plaintiff satisfy the statu-
tory prerequisites for injunctive 8 or declaratory relief,9 but a party
seeking a federal forum in which to challenge a state criminal statute
must contend with an elusive mix of abstention, 10 equity, comity, and
federalism."
7. The term anticipatory relief is used to encompass both the injunctive and de-
claratory remedies. The issuance of a declaratory judgment, however, is governed by
statutory as well as equitable principles. See, e.g., Gordon Johnson Co. v. Hunt, 102
F. Supp. 1008 (N.D. Ohio 1952); Bakelite Corp. v. Lubri-Zol Dev. Corp., 34 F. Supp.
142 (D.C. Del. 1940); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). The
remedy is more precisely sui generis, having both equitable and legal characteristics.
See Beacon Theaters v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959) (jury trial available in de-
claratory judgment action where issues in controversy were legal in nature). See gen-
erally C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 449-50 (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as WRIGHT].
8. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). The antipathy towards federal intervention in state
court proceedings by injunction was expressed in legislation as early as 1793. Act of
Mar. 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5, 1 Stat. 335 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970)). That Act
prohibited the issuance of an injunction by a federal court to stay proceedings in any
state court. Congress enacted the existing exceptions to this general proscription in
Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 869 (codified in Judicial Code of 1948, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1251 etseq. (1970)).
9. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970). The Declaratory Judgment Act was passed in
1934 to create a new remedy for the federal arsenal. See S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934).
Justice Brennan traced the history and purpose of the Act at length in his separate
opinion in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-15 (1971). He contended that the Act
"was intended to provide an alternative to injunctions against state officials, except
where there was a federal policy against federal adjudication of the class of litigation
altogether." Id. at 115. Justice Brennan further stated:
[T] he Senate report's clear implication that declaratory relief would have been
appropriate in [certain named cases] . . . and the report's quotation from Ter-
race v. Thompson, which also involved anticipatory federal adjudication of the
constitutionality of a state criminal statute, make it plain that Congress antici-
pated that the declaratory judgment procedure would be used by the federal
courts to test the constitutionality of state criminal statutes.
Id. (citations omitted). See S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1964), quoted at
401 U.S. at 111-12.
10. The Supreme Court has recognized circumstances in which a federal court
should decline to decide a controversy involving state law even though it has juris-
diction either under the Constitution or by statutory provision. Under this policy of
abstention, a federal court will not interfere in state proceedings even to adjudicate
federal claims where considerations of comity, convenience and avoidance of multiple
litigation outweigh the potential for delay in the state court and possible jeopardizing
210
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In the Supreme Court's application of these doctrines, different
tests have evolved to determine whether anticipatory relief should be
granted. The availability of such relief depends on the status of the
state prosecution and the type of relief requested. As a result of this
sometimes erratic evolution, three discrete patterns can be identified
which involve anticipatory relief from prosecution under an allegedly
unconstitutional state criiinal statute. In the first pattern, some state
prosecutorial action has been taken when the federal plaintiff seeks
either an injunction against continued prosecution or a declaratory
judgment as to the constitutionality of the challenged statute. The
second pattern involves the request for injunctive relief when state
of constitutional protections. See generally Note, Abstention: An Exercise in Federal-
ism, 108 PENN. L. REv. 226 (1959). In clearly enunciating the doctrine for the first
time, the Court found:
a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal
courts, "exercising a wise discretion," restrain their authority because of "scrupu-
lous regard for the rightful independence of the state governments" and for the
smooth working of the federal judiciary.
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 494, 501 (1941). Since the
Pullman decision, the abstention concept has been applied in various contexts. In-
deed, Professor Wright identifies four discrete abstention doctrines. See WRIGHT, supra
note 7, at 196-208. However, as the Court noted in Lake Carriers Ass'n v. MacMullan,
406 U.S. 498 (1972), the factors governing the propriety of abstention are separate
from the question of whether a particular plaintiff may be entitled to injunctive or
declaratory relief. This distinction can become difficult because the policy of absten-
tion is closely related to principles of equity, comity, and federalism, determinative
factors according to Steffel in awarding anticipatory relief. See Spears, The Supreme
Court February Sextet: Younger v. Harris Revisited, 26 BAYLOR L. REv. 1, 20 n.101
(1974).
11. The Court in Steffel identified "equity, comity, and federalism" as a shorthand
notation for the principles militating against federal interference in state criminal
prosecutions. 415 U.S. at 460. This combination of principles comes from the Court's
decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See notes 21-25 and accompany-
ing text infra. "Equity" encompasses the doctrine that "courts of equity should not
act, and particularly should not act to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the
moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury
if denied equitable relief." 401 U.S. at 43-44. The terms "comity" and "federalism"
are often used interchangeably by the Court. Comity refers to the more general
principle that courts of one jurisdiction will give effect to the judicial decisions of
another out of deference rather than obligation. See Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson,
293 U.S. 335 (1934), where Justice Cardozo viewed comity as a means for avoiding
unnecessary collision between state and federal courts. Federalism involves the notion
of comity as it applies to relations between the federal and state systems. As the
Court stated in Younger:
[T] he notion of 'comity' [requires] a proper respect for state functions, a recog-
nition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will
fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate
functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer
way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism"....
401 U.S. at 44.
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prosecution is threatened but not pending. 12 In the third situation,
prosecution is again threatened and not pending, but the plaintiff
seeks a declaratory judgment that the state criminal statute is uncon-
stitutional.
The Steffel decision represents the first articulation of a distinct test
for deciding whether anticipatory relief is appropriate in the third pat-
tern. This note will review the development of these patterns and the
12. The circumstances under which a threatened state prosecution becomes pend-
ing are not altogether clear. Generally the courts have considered the point of indict-
ment to be the critical stage. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 27 (1971). Justice
Rehnquist, on the other hand, concurring in Steffel, would look to the time of arrest.
415 U.S. at 480. Chief Justice Burger, in Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802, 842-43
(1974), views the time of filing charges as significant in a state criminal proceeding.
See notes 39-43 and accompanying text supra. Under the latter test, there could
never be federal anticipatory relief if a prosecutorial threat was required before the
federal plaintiff would have the requisite standing on which relief could be granted.
Since no relief could be granted after a threat, there would be no time at which relief
could be granted. See note 53 and accompanying text infra.
Alternative propositions may be noted as well. In Burak v. Commonwealth of Pa.,
339 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1972), an action for declaration of unconstitutionality
of a Pennsylvania criminal libel statute and an injunction against its enforcement
were dismissed for lack of showing of irreparable injury, bad faith prosecution and
harassment. The district court held that the state criminal prosecution, having com-
menced by the filing of a criminal complaint, was thereby pending at the time of the
federal suit for declaratory and injunctive relief and thus the tests of Younger and
Samuels had to be met. Id. at 536. In Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971), the
Supreme Court held that indictments based upon challenged Massachusetts obscenity
laws, although dismissed before a decision on the merits of plaintiffs federal action
had been rendered, would be sufficient to invoke the Younger pending requirements.
The Third Circuit rule is that dismissal of a suit for declaratory or injunctive relief
will be proper under Younger-Samuels where the suit has been initiated after the
filing of a state criminal complaint but before the grand jury has met. Lewis v. Kugler,
446 F.2d 1343, 1348 n.8 (3d Cir. 1971).
It has been proposed that the commencement of state criminal proceedings be
determined at the date of first official action against an individual. See The Supreme
Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 309 (1971). If such a distinction is carried
to its logical conclusion, a state prosecutor could permanently close the doors of fed-
eral court to potential plaintiffs against whom charges, however lacking in merit,
were filed and even though they were later dropped.
A recent example of the confusion which surrounds the uncertainty of standards
for the definition of "pending" is provided by Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 95 S. Ct. 2561
(1975). In Doran, the Court held that legally distinct plaintiffs joining together in
the federal complaint were to be judged separately for determining whether any of
their number were state criminal defendants and for applying the Younger-Samuels
formulae. See also Allee v. Medrano, supra at 832-33 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
In this connection, a prosecution will be deemed retroactively pending where any
one of the federal plaintiffs after filing suit for anticipatory relief in federal court re-
sumes the activity prohibited under the challenged statute and state prosecution is
commenced against him. Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, stated:
Having violated the ordinance, rather than awaiting the normal development of
its federal lawsuit, [plaintiff] cannot now be heard to complain that its consti-
tutional contentions are being resolved in a state court. Thus [plaintiffs] prayers
for both injunctive and declaratory relief are subject to Younger's restrictions.
Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., supra at 2567.
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tests presently employed for each, and will discuss the impact of Steffel
in the context of federal anticipatory relief. As will be shown, the
decision leaves unanswered important questions regarding the nature of
the declaratory judgment remedy and suggests that the Court is substi-
tuting a definitional test for a balancing test in the award of prospec-
tive relief.
I. PROSECUTION PENDING: INJUNCTION OR
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT REQUESTED
From the nation's beginning, the federal government has chosen to
rely upon state courts for the vindication of rights arising under the
Constitution and federal laws and to avoid interference with state ad-
judication of those rights. 13 In Ex Parte Young,14 the Supreme Court
13. In the first century of the country's history, the powers granted in art. III,
§ 2, cl. 1 of the Constitution were not fully utilized by the Congress and the federal
courts; indeed, the eleventh amendment, prompted by reaction to federal interference
in state activity in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793), restricted
the power of federal courts by removing their jurisdiction in suits to which a state
was a party. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 105-07 (1971) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
The nationalistic impulse following the Civil War resulted in legislation expanding
the authority of federal courts. The Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1970), creating federal question jurisdiction, allowed federal district courts to hear
all civil suits in which the matter in dispute exceeded a statutorily specified amount
and which arose under the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States. As a
result of the Act the district courts became "the primary and powerful reliances for
vindicating every right given by the Constitution, the laws and treaties of the United
States." Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 247 (1967), citing F. FRANKFURTER &
J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL SYSTEM 65 (1928). The Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970)
(originally enacted as Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13), invested lower
federal courts with power to determine the constitutionality of conduct "under color
of state law" which allegedly deprived individuals of federally protected rights. See
note 2 supra. The Court in Steffel noted that "these two statutes, together with the
Court's decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) . . . have 'established the
modern framework for federal protection of constitutional rights from state inter-
ference.'" 415 U.S. at 464-65. Prior to the twentieth century, however, federal
courts did not utilize these statutes to intervene in state prosecutions. They generally
assumed that the eleventh amendment precluded such interference. See, e.g., Hagood
v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886). This sentiment was reinforced by the continued ef-
ficacy of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), which was revised in
1878, 1911, and 1940. See notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text infra.
14. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Young represented the first attempt to sort out the con-
flicting trends which emerged in the second half of the nineteenth century. In Young,
a bill was sought to enjoin a company from complying with an act of the state legis-
lature setting allowable rates to be charged by railroads operating within the state,
the violation of which would result in either fine, imprisonment or both. The Court
held the state statute invalid on its face. More importantly, the Court affirmed a cita-
tion for contempt against the state Attorney General who had sought enforcement
213
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established a new precedent by staying state criminal proceedings and
by enforcing an injunction against their continuance when the statu-
tory basis for prosecution was under challenge. While Young provided
an impetus for the evolution of federal intervention in state prosecu-
tions, the general rule nonetheless remained that a federal court would
not interfere with state criminal proceedings whether pending or
threatened. 15 The Supreme Court, in Douglas v. City of Jeannette,16
clearly articulated this doctrine. In Douglas Chief Justice Stone
stated:17
Congress . . . has adopted the policy .. of leaving generally to the
state courts the trial of criminal cases arising under state laws, subject
to review by this Court of any federal questions involved. Hence,
courts of equity in the exercise of their discretionary powers should
conform to this policy by refusing to interfere with or embarrass
threatened proceedings in state courts save in those exceptional cases
which call for the interposition of a court of equity to prevent irrepar-
of the statute despite the district court's injunction against enforcement pending the
outcome of litigation on the constitutional question. "An injunction to prevent a
[state official] from doing that which he has no legal right to do is not an inter-
ference with the discretion of an officer." Id. at 159. Ex parte Young did not actually
violate the Anti-Injunction Act since the statute proscribed only injunctions preventing
state officials from instituting future proceedings; it was silent regarding pending
state action. See WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 206.
15. The storm of controversy following the Young decision indicated the sensi-
tivity of states to potential federal inroads on their sovereignty. See Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL
L.Q. 499 (1928); Hutcheson, A Case for Three Judges, 47 HARV. L. REV. 795 (1934).
The congressional response was to require a three-judge panel in suits for interlocu-
tory injunctions with direct review by the Supreme Court. Act of June 18, 1910,
Pub. L. No. 218, § 17, 36 Stat. 557 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1970)). This
action did not fully quell the uproar; indeed, the issue continued to be the subject of
legislation for years. See generally P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, & H. WECHSLER,
HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 967-79 (2d
ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as HART AND WECHSLER]. Despite Congressional attempts
to curtail federal courts, the judiciary did not return to the pre-Ex parte Young
attitude of total noninterference although restrictions on intervention were imposed.
See, e.g., Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926). See generally Maraist, Federal
Intervention in State Criminal Proceedings: Dombrowski, Younger, and Beyond,
50 TEXAS L. REV. 1324, 1325-32 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Maraist]; Warren,
Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345, 359-78 (1930).
16. 319 U.S. 157 (1943). In Douglas, a group of Jehovah's Witnesses had sought
injunctive relief against a threatened prosecution in a state court for violations of a
city ordinance which prohibited solicitation of orders for merchandise without a
license issued by the municipality. Despite a determination that the challenged or-
dinance was unconstitutional in a companion case, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943), the Court held that equitable relief was inappropriate absent
demonstration of imminent and irreparable injury beyond that incident to every good-
faith criminal prosecution.
17. 319 U.S. at 163.
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able injury which is clear and imminent; and equitable remedies in-
fringing this independence of the states-though they might otherwise
be given-should be withheld if sought on slight or inconsequential
grounds.
Thus, Douglas required that a plaintiff show special circumstances
beyond those traditionally necessary in equity, i.e., a "grave and im-
mediate" threat to the existence of a constitutionally protected activity
before a federal court could render prospective relief. The nature of
such special circumstances where the state prosecution is pending can
best be analyzed by examining the type of relief sought.
A. Injunctive Relief
Three distinct requirements must be met by a plaintiff seeking an
injunction against pending state prosecution in federal court. First, he
must meet the traditional equitable standards of imminent irreparable
injury and the absence of an adequate remedy at law.' 8 Second, the
action he brings must qualify as one of the exceptions permitted by
the federal Anti-Injunction Act,' 9 which limits the issuance of a fed-
eral injunction to restrain pending state proceedings to three situa-
tions: (1) where expressly authorized by Act of Congress;20 (2) where
necessary in aid of the court's jurisdiction; or (3) where required to
protect or effectuate the court's judgment. Finally, in Younger v.
Harris?' the Supreme Court erected the last and most substantial
hurdle facing a federal plaintiff seeking an injunction against a
pending state prosecution.
In Younger, the Court held that the federal plaintiff must not only
meet the requirements of the Anti-Injunction Act and of traditional
equitable jurisprudence, but must also demonstrate prosecutorial bad.
18. See note 8 supra. See also Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State
Court Proceedings: The Significance of Dombrowski, 48 TEXAS L. REv. 535, 547
(1970).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970). See note 8 supra.
20. In Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), the Court held that in suits
brought to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970), injunctions
to stay state court proceedings are "expressly authorized by Act of Congress" within
the meaning of the Anti-Injunction Act. But, the Court noted that "we do not ques-
tion or qualify in any way the principles of equity, comity and federalism that must
restrain a federal court when asked to enjoin a state court proceeding." Id. at 243.
Steffel brought his action under the Civil Rights Act. See note 2 and accompanying
text supra.
21. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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faith, harassment, or some other similarly exceptional circum-
stances.22 Thus, a federal court may not enjoin the good faith prosecu-
tion of a state criminal statute even if it appears unconstitutional on
its face.23 The Court reasoned that although federal courts may be
anxious to vindicate constitutional rights, the principle of federalism
precludes interference with state court proceedings lawfully instituted
absent such extraordinary circumstances. In reaching this conclusion,
the Court halted the trend of lower federal courts to expansively inter-
pret Dombrowski v. Pfister,24 and for the first time suggested that the
status of the state prosecution affects the appropriateness of federal
anticipatory relief.2 5
B. Declaratory Judgment
In order to provide a more viable remedy than injunctive relief for
testing the constitutionality of state statutes, Congress enacted the
22. Id. at 54. The Court did not mention what other "unusual circumstances"
might be. Id. See Note, I Used to Love You But It's All Over Now: Abstention and
the Federal Courts Retreat from their Role as Primary Guardians of First Amend-
ment Freedoms, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 847 (1972). See also Note, Implications of
the Younger Cases for the Availability of Federal Equitable Relief When No State
Prosecution is Pending, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 874 (1972); Note, Federal Relief Against
Threatened State Prosecutions: The Implications of Younger, Lake Carriers and Roe,
48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 965 (1973).
23. 401 U.S. at 53-54.
24. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). See notes 32-36 and accompanying text infra. See also
Sedler, Dombrowski in the Wake of Younger: The View From Without and Within,
1972 Wis. L. REV. 1.
25. The Younger analysis presupposes that the pendency of state criminal action
will be crucial in a decision to permit or to abstain from affording federal anticipa-
tory relief. The Court stated: "We do not think this allegation, even if true, is suffi-
cient to bring the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts into play to enjoin a
pending state prosecution. A federal lawsuit to stop a prosecution in a state court is a
serious matter." 401 U.S. at 42. Under such circumstances, the "chilling" factors
that prompted the granting of federal relief in Dombrowski are presumably less
compelling. The Court stated: "[T] his sort of 'chilling effect,' as the Court called it,
should not by itself justify federal intervention. . . . Moreover, the existence of a
'chilling effect,' even in the area of First Amendment rights, has never been con-
sidered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for prohibiting state action." Id. at 50-51.
Accord, Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (injunction against enforcement
of anti-picketing statute challenged as a vague and overbroad denied where prosecu-
tion pending and record did not establish the necessary bad faith and harassment).
This rule is justified for two reasons: First, it may be costly to abate state proceed-
ings and then place the burden upon the state to re-prosecute if it prevailed on the
federal issues; second, the possible sources of injury to fundamental constitutional
rights may be less easily identifiable or correctable prior to state initiation of the crim-
inal process.
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Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934.26 By means of this statutory rem-
edy, Congress contemplated a vehicle by which a citizen could obtain
an authoritative pronouncement of his federal rights without sus-
taining the costs of criminal prosecution, and without the intrusive
effects of an injunction against state court action.27
Despite these salutary purposes, the Supreme Court in Samuels v.
Mackell2 s superimposed the requirements of Younger on the federal
plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of a
state statute under which he was being prosecuted. In Samuels, the
Court stated:29
[I] n cases where the criminal proceeding [is] begun prior to the fed-
eral civil suit, the propriety of declaratory and injunctive relief should
be judged by essentially the same standards. . . . [D] eeply rooted
and long-settled principles of equity have narrowly restricted the
scope for federal intervention, and ordinarily a declaratory judgment
will result in precisely the same interference with and disruption of
state proceedings that the long-standing policy limiting injunctions
was designed to avoid.
Thus, when seeking declaratory relief against a pending state criminal
proceeding, the plaintiff must allege facts which show bad faith,
harassment, or other extraordinary circumstances.
26. The Act is codified in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02 (1970). Section 2201 pro-
vides:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to
federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought. Any
such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree
and shall be reviewable as such.
Section 2202 also provides: "Further necessary or proper relief based on a declara-
tory judgment or decree may be granted, after reasonable notice and hearing, against
any adverse party whose rights have been determined by such judgment." See gen-
erally S. EAGER, THE DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION (1971).
27. See S. REP. No. 1005, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, 6 (1934). The House Com-
mittee Report stated: "The principle involved in this form of procedure is to confer
upon the courts the power to exercise in some instances preventive relief; a function
now performed rather clumsily by our equitable proceedings and inadequately by
the law courts." H.R. REP. No. 1264, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934), quoted in Perez
v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111-12 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Summarizing, Justice Brennan stated: "The express purpose of the Federal
Declaratory Judgment Act was to provide a milder alternative to the injunction
remedy." Id. at 111.
28. 401 U.S. 66 (1971). In Samuels the plaintiffs were indicted under a New
York statute on charges of criminal anarchy and sought federal relief in the form
of an injunction, or, alternatively, declaratory judgment on grounds that the statute
was void for vagueness and violative of first and fourteenth amendment rights.
29. Id. at 72.
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II. PROSECUTION THREATENED: INJUNCTION
REQUESTED
As suggested above, 30 the distinction between pending and threat-
ened state prosecution is a relatively recent development in the law of
federal anticipatory relief. Following Ex parte Young, federal courts
prohibited intervention against threatened prosecutions just as they
had prohibited intervention against pending prosecutions, i.e., absent
a showing of special circumstances federal intervention was imper-
missable.31
In Dombrowski v. Pfister,32 the Supreme Court attempted to give
substance to the "special circumstances" test where state prosecution
had not been commenced. The Dombrowski Court held that an in-
junction would be appropriate (1) where a statute was facially uncon-
stitutional because of vagueness or overbreadth, or (2) where a stat-
ute, although valid on its face, was being enforced in bad faith.33 The
Court's reasoning thus closely adhered to the irreparable injury test
for traditional equitable relief. In essence, the Court held that a fed-
eral plaintiff demonstrating either bad faith harassment of a constitu-
tionally protected activity, or threatened prosecution under a facially
unconstitutional state statute, suffered sufficient irreparable injury to
warrant federal relief.34 The Court also held that before a statute
30. See text accompanying note 25 supra.
31. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Watson v.
Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941).
32. 380 U.S. 479 (1965). In Dombrowski, plaintiffs claimed that Louisiana offi-
cials unlawfully threatened to enforce the state's Communist control statute against
their organization, the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. The complaint
alleged that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and that the threat of prose-
cution constituted part of a plan to harass the plaintiffs' organization and to dis-
courage their efforts in the civil rights area.
In addition to seeking injunctive relief, the Dombrowski plaintiffs also sought a
declaratory judgment. While the Court found the Louisiana statute void on its face,
it did not suggest whether a different set of tests was to be applied in the event that
only a declaratory judgment was requested. Rather, the Court blended the discussion
of relief into a generalized analysis of the applicability of the abstention doctrine in
the factual situation presented. See generally Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister: Fed-
eral Injunction Against State Prosecution in Civil Rights Cases-A New Trend in
Federal-State Relations, 34 FOROHAM L. REV. 71 (1965).
33. 380 U.S. at 490-92.
34. The Court reasoned that the exercise of first amendment rights would be
chilled in "a situation in which defense of the State's criminal prosecution will not
assure adequate vindication of constitutional rights." Id. at 485. In such a situation
the Court held that there was sufficient irreparable injury to justify equitable interven-
tion by means of an injunction:
[A] bstention serves no legitimate purpose where a statute regulating speech is
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could be found unconstitutional on its face it must appear unlikely
that it was susceptible of a limiting construction by a state tribunal.
The Court in Dombrowski did not presume, as it did subsequently
in Younger,3 5 that the state court must be allowed an opportunity to
interpret the challenged statute. Nor did Dombrowski require a
showing of the improbability of a saving construction of the statute
before a federal court would entertain jurisdiction of a dispute under
it.36 These factors suggest that the Court did not contemplate a broad
scale use of abstention in injunction proceedings where a statute is
attacked either on its face or as applied, its application is in bad faith,
and no state prosecution is extant.
Although the holding of Dombrowski applied only to cases of
threatened prosecution, the Court's broad language suggested that the
status of the state prosecution should not be determinative of the fed-
eral plaintiffs right to intervene. Consequently, federal courts ex-
panded Dombrowski to encompass pending prosecutions.37 As indi-
cated above,38 the Court's subsequent response in Younger halted this
trend and imposed additional requirements where the state had com-
menced its criminal process.
properly attacked on its face, and where, as here, the conduct charged in the
indictments is not within the reach of an acceptable limiting construction read-
ily to be anticipated as a result of a single criminal prosecution and is not the
sort of "hard-core" conduct that would obviously be prohibited under any con-
struction.
Id. at 491-92.
35. See text accompanying notes 21-22 supra.
36. Lower federal court decisions have received mixed responses from the Su-
preme Court where the propriety of staying federal action prefatory to construction
of a state statute by a state court is at issue. Compare Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S.
82 (1970) (three-judge district court ordered to abstain from ruling on the merits of
an Alaskan fishing regulation) and Askew v. Hargrave, 401 U.S. 476 (1971) (case
remanded to await consideration of state constitutional claims by a state tribunal
prior to a hearing on the merits of an equal protection challenge to a Florida statute)
with Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971) (upholding a three-judge dis-
trict court decision which invalidated the continued enforcement of a previously un-
interpreted Wisconsin statute providing for posting of the name of any person "who
by [reason of] excessive drinking" exhibited certain traits). In Constantineau, the
Court found that the absence of provisions for notice or opportunity to be heard
prior to the posting represented an unambiguous denial of due process and therefore
required no prior construction by state courts.
37. See, e.g., Stein v. Batchelor, 300 F. Supp. 602 (N.D. Tex. 1969), rev'd sub
nom. Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Wheeler v. Goodman, 298 F. Supp. 935
(W.D.N.C. 1969) (injunction granted to prevent the harassment or prosecution of
a group of "hippies" under the state vagrancy statute); Cambist Films, Inc. v. Illi-
nois, 292 F. Supp. 185 (N.D. Ill. 1968) (injunction granted releasing purportedly
obscene film and staying state prosecution of theatre owner). See generally Maraist,
supra note 18, at 591-603.
38. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
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The effect of the Younger constriction on the Dombrowski holding
vis-A-vis threatened prosecutions remains uncertain. The Court's most
recent statement in this area, Allee v. Medrano,39 recited the Dom-
browski tests but failed to reach a precise holding. Because the record
did not indicate whether the plaintiffs were currently being prosecuted
under one or all of the challenged statutes, the Court remanded. 40
Allee is significant, however, because of the concurring opinion of
Chief Justice Burger4' in which he voiced support for the require-
ment of showing substantial risk of future bad faith prosecution 42 as a
prerequisite to an injunction against anticipated conduct of state offi-
cials. In essence, Chief Justice Burger and the two justices joining in
his opinion assumed that the Younger tests should apply in instances
of threatened enforcements of allegedly unconstitutional statutes
where the relief sought is injunctive. 43
39. 416 U.S. 802 (1974). Allee involved the alleged intimidation and harassment
of union organizers for the United Farm Workers by law enforcement officials acting
under color of several state statutes. A class action was brought by the United Farm
Workers Organizing Committee and certain named individuals under 42 U.S.C. §§
1983, 1985 (1970), charging that various Texas Rangers and other county law en-
forcement officers had violated the plaintiffs' first amendment rights of free speech
and assembly through unlawful arrests and physical abuse. The complaint sought
injunctive and declaratory relief to prevent the enforcement of the statutory bases
for official action, i.e., five Texas statutes prohibiting mass picketing; secondary picket-
ing, strikes and boycotts; unlawful assembly; breach of the reace; and, abusive lan-
guage. A three-judge district court granted both forms of requested relief.
40. Id. at 820-21. The Court stated in summary:
[A] Ithough there was a live controversy as to these statutes at the time of the
District Court decree, if there are no pending prosecutions under the old statutes,
the portions of the District Court's judgment relating to them has become moot.
But because we cannot determine with certainty whether there are pending
prosecutions, or even whether the District Court intended to enjoin them if
there were, the proper disposition is to remand the case to the District Court
for further findings.
Id. at 818 (footnote omitted).
41. Id. at 821 (Burger, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
42. The Chief Justice construed "bad faith" to encompass threats by the prosecut-
ing attorney and not merely the remarks of a police officer. Id. at 837.
43. Chief Justice Burger was joined by Justices White and Rehnquist. In con-
cluding, he indicated that federal intervention would be appropriate only in the fol-
lowing circumstances:
[A] state court cannot effectively fulfill its responsibility when the prosecutorial
authorities take deliberate action, in bad faith, unfairly to deprive a person of a
reasonable and adequate opportunity to make application in the state courts for
vindication of his constitutional rights. When such an individual, deprived of
meaningful access to the state courts, faces irreparable injury to constitutional
rights of great and immediate magnitude, either in the immediate suit or in the
substantial likelihood of "repeated prosecutions to which he will be subjected"
. .. and the injury demands prompt relief, federal courts are not prevented by
considerations of comity from granting the extraordinary remedy of interference
in pending state criminal prosecutions.
Id. at 835 (Burger, CJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation omitted).
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III. PROSECUTION THREATENED: DECLARATORY
JUDGMENT REQUESTED
A. The Steffel Case
Steffel v. Thompson presented the Supreme Court with the issue
reserved in Samuels v. Mackell;44 that is, the applicability of Younger
to the granting of declaratory relief when no state prosecution is
pending but when a threat of prosecution legitimately exists. In exam-
ining this question, the district court had read Younger and Samuels
as requiring the denial of relief.45 The Supreme Court rejected the dis-
trict court's analysis, holding that where no state criminal proceeding
is pending at the time the federal suit is filed, the principles militating
in favor of abstention are not compelling.46 The Court reasoned that
intervention under such circumstances would not result in duplication
or disruption of state proceedings; neither could it then be interpreted
as a denial of state competence to decide constitutional issues raised
by its own statutes.47
Most significantly, the Court held that when no state criminal pro-
ceeding is pending at the time of the federal action, the appropriate-
ness of a declaratory judgment is to be considered independently from
the question of the availability of an injunction. 48 Writing for the
majority, Justice Brennan relied heavily on his separate opinion in
Perez v. Ledesma.49 Focusing on the legislative history of the Declara-
44. 401 U.S. 66 (1971). See text accompanying notes 28-29 supra.
45. Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ga. 1971). The district court
held that a federal court cannot hypothesize as to the potential consequences of future
arrests for a present plaintiff, and therefore, ought not to intervene prospectively
absent a showing of either bad-faith enforcement or harassment, or both. This bad-
faith test was presumed to apply equally to injunctions and declaratory judgments.
Id. at 1389.
46. 415 U.S. at462.
47. Id.
48. The Court stated: "When no state proceeding is pending and thus considera-
tions of equity, comity, and federalism have little vitality, the propriety of granting
federal declaratory relief may properly be considered independently of a request for
injunctive relief." Id.
49. 401 U.S. 82, 93 (1971). Perez is one of a group of six cases which were
decided on the same day as Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and which came
to be known as the Younger or February Sextet. Appellees in Perez had been ar-
rested and charged with violation of a Louisiana statute and a local ordinance pro-
hibiting the display of obscene materials. After the state court proceedings had been
initiated by the filing of informations, appellees filed suit in federal district court for
a declaration that the statute and ordinance were unconstitutional and for an in-
junction against their enforcement. The three-judge district court refused to grant
injunctive relief and upheld the constitutionality of the challenged laws, but found
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tory Judgment Act, he maintained that Congress intended a declara-
tory judgment-prospective relief which is less disruptive of a state's
affairs than an injunction-to be an alternative to injunction.50 Un-
der his analysis, a declaratory judgment is persuasive whereas an in-
junction is coercive. Noncompliance with a declaratory judgment,
however inappropriate, would not, unlike noncompliance with an
injunction, constitute contempt.51 Thus, under Steffel, where a federal
plaintiff can demonstrate a genuine threat of prosecution under an al-
legedly unconstitutional state statute, he can obtain a declaration of
his rights in federal court.
that the arrests and seizure of materials were invalid. It issued a suppression order
prohibiting the use of the illegally obtained material in the state proceedings. A
single-judge district court subsequently held the ordinances invalid. On appeal the
Supreme Court held that the issuance of the suppression order effectively curtailing
the then-pending good-faith state criminal prosecution was in the nature of an in-
junction and therefore inappropriate. The Court remanded to the district court for a
redetermination of the declaration of constitutionality. Id. at 88.
Justice Brennan concurred in the decision regarding the impropriety of injunctive
relief in these circumstances, but dissented to the remand on the ground that the
declaratory judgment was within the discretion of the district court. His opinion set
forth in detail the perspective adopted by the majority of the Court in Steffel with
respect to the nature of declaratory relief and its effects. See notes 9 & 27 supra.
50. But cf. the majority opinion of Justice Black in Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S.
66 (1971). In ruling that neither injunctive nor declaratory relief was appropriate
in the face of pending state criminal prosecution, the Court noted that the practical
effects of both an injunction and a declaratory judgment were identical. Id. at 71-72.
However, the Court observed:
There may be unusual circumstances in which an injunction might be withheld
because, despite a plaintiffs strong claim for relief under the established
standards, the injunctive remedy seemed particularly intrusive or offensive; in
such a situation, a declaratory judgment might be appropriate and might not be
contrary to the basic equitable doctrines governing the availability of relief.
Id. at 73 (emphasis added). See also Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968),
where the Court affirmed the denial of a declaratory judgment that an anti-picketing
statute was valid on its face in circumstances in which an injunction would not lie.
Persuasive reasons exist for confining the Younger restrictions to requests for in-junction only. First, the legislative history of the Declaratory Judgment Act clearly
indicates that the declarative remedy was designed to be made available to federal
plaintiffs regardless of the availability of injunctive relief. See notes 9 & 27 supra.
Justice Black's equation of declaratory and injunctive relief negates the utility of
the declarative remedy when a state prosecution is pending. In addition, this equation
fails to recognize that considerations of federalism do not militate as strongly for
abstention when a declaratory judgment is requested. Under Justice Brennan's analy-
sis, Congress did not intend it to be as substantial an interference with state proceed-
ings as an injunction. Finally, the absence of an "anti-declaratory judgment" statute
indicates that a negative mandate does not exist as in the case of the Anti-Injunction
Act. This reinforces the conclusion that Congress did not intend that declaratory
relief should be summarily denied because an injunction is inappropriate. Thus, the
recognition in Steffel that differing considerations are to be applied in assessing the
availability of each type of anticipatory relief may require a re-examination of the
Samuels holding.
51. 415 U.S. at 471, citing Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 124-26 (1971)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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While the Court unanimously agreed that the tests for a declaratory
judgment and those for an injunction should be severed in the context
of threatened state criminal action, the impact of Steffel is by no
means certain. Four justices participated in three concurring opinions
which reflect substantial disagreement as to the extent of the holding
and the consequences of a declaratory judgment remedy.
B. The Steffel Legacy-Unanswered Questions of Federal
Anticipatory Relief
1. The problems of article III
The Steffel Court clearly indicated that where a state prosecution is
not pending a federal plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment need
not demonstrate irreparable injury-a requirement when seeking in-
junctive relief.52 The extent to which this holding expands the availa-
bility of the declaratory judgment remedy, however, may depend on
the attitude of the Court in examining the requirements of article III
of the Constitution. 53 When state prosecution has been commenced,
52. The Court stated:[E] ngrafting upon the Declaratory Judgment Act a requirement that all of the
traditional equitable prerequisites to the issuance of an injunction be satisfied be-
fore the issuance of a declaratory judgment is considered would defy Congress'
intent to make declaratory relief available in cases where an injunction would be
inappropriate.
415 U.S. at 471. Justice Brennan also quoted Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st
Cir. 1972), to the effect that superimposing equitable prerequisites on the declaratoryjudgment remedy would amount to pro tanto repeal of the Declaratory Judgment
Act. Id. at 832.
53. The constitutional power of the federal judiciary presupposes the existence
of a case or controversy under article III. This requirement is also statutorily im-
posed in actions for declaratory judgments. See note 26 supra. Defining the prerequi-
sites of a constitutionally sufficient case or controversy, however, has been an elusive
task. As Chief Justice Warren appropriately noted, the language of case or contro-
versy is the simplistic tip of an exceptionally complex iceberg. See Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968). Essentially two notions are intertwined. First, the party seek-
ing a federal forum must have a personal interest in the controversy's outcome and
be sufficiently adverse in his interest to be an appropriate advocate of the claim. This
is the problem of standing. See, e.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the
War, 418 U.S. 208, 216-28 (1974) (interest shared by public at large necessarily
implies an injury too abstract on which to base standing of citizens' associations to
challenge armed forces reserve membership of members of Congress); Flast v.
Cohen, supra at 99-100 (sufficient taxpayer interest found to confer standing based
upon alleged abuse of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (debasement of voting power as alleged
denial of equal protection is a sufficient personal stake in the outcome of litigation for
standing to seek reapportionment of legislative districts). See generally HART & WECH-
SLER, supra note 15, at 151-83; WRiGHT, supra note 7, at 39-45. The second notion
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the defendant is clearly confronted with a concrete dispute. Thus, it is
not surprising that the Court summarily disposed of the justiciability
issue in Younger54 and passed upon it sub silentio in Samuels.55 On
the other hand, in the absence of such proceedings, the requirement of
an actual controversy becomes more problematic. The more removed
from the criminal process a federal plaintiff becomes, the less concrete
the controversy. In Steffel, the Court indicated that the threat of arrest
was both real and immediate when the federal action was filed, and
therefore the circumstances fulfilled the constitutional requirements. 56
As Justice Stewart noted in his concurring opinion, however, the
involves an inquiry into the nature of the dispute, i.e., its justiciability. Because of the
historic aversion to advisory opinions, the Court has traditionally required a sub-
stantial controversy which is appropriate for judicial resolution. See, e.g., Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
against army surveillance of civilian political activity not justiciable); Poe v. Ullman,
367 U.S. 497 (1961) (state practice of not prosecuting under anti-contraception
statute made challenge nonjusticiable); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75 (1947) (proposed conduct by federal employees in violation of the Hatch Act
did not present a suitable controversy for adjudication). The Court has indicated in
the anticipatory relief context that article III requires the allegation of actual or
threatened, and not merely conjectural or hypothetical, injury. See, e.g., O'Shea v.
Littleton, 414 U.S. 488,(1974) (denial of injunction against allegedly illegal bail and
jury fee setting affirmed where plaintiffs had shown neither past injury nor any likeli-
hood of prospective injury); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108-10 (1969) (ac-
tion for declaratory judgment to invalidate statute prohibiting anonymous campaign
literature not maintainable where election had been held and the candidate who was
the subject of the literature was unlikely to run for election in the future). See gen-
erally WRIGHT, supra note 7, at 39-45. It has been noted that the Court's treatment
of the standing and justiciability questions in the context of federal anticipatory
relief has overlapped. See Comment, Federal Declaratory Relief from Unconstitu-
tional State Statutes: The Implications of Steffel v. Thompson, 9 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-
Civ. LIB. L. REV. 520, 527 n.44 (1974).
54. The original federal plaintiff in Younger had been indicted in state court
before he brought the federal action. The Court concluded: "He thus has an acute,
live controversy with the State and its prosecutor." 401 U.S. at 41. Three other inter-
venors who were not indicted but who alleged inhibition of their first amendment
rights because of Harris' prosecution were dismissed from the suit because the Court
found that they lacked standing. Id. at 42.
55. In Sanuels, unlike Younger, all the federal plaintiffs were indicted in state
court before the federal claim was filed. The Court initially indicated that indictments
existed and did not discuss article III problems thereafter.
56. The Court stated:
Unlike three of the appellees in Younger v. Harris . . . petitioner has alleged
threats of prosecution that cannot be characterized as "imaginary or specula-
tive .... ." He has been twice warned to stop handbilling . . . and has been told
by the police if he again handbills at the shopping center and disobeys a warn-
ing to stop he will likely be prosecuted. The prosecution of petitioner's hand-
billing companion is ample demonstration that petitioner's concern with arrest
has not been "chimerical .... "
415 U.S. at 459 (citations omitted). This statement applied only to the time of the
action's commencement. The issue of its applicability through all stages of the litiga-
tion was the subject of the Court's remand. Id. See notes 59 & 60 and accompanying
text infra.
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number of cases in which such a genuine threat of enforcement exists
may be slight.57
Justice Stewart's prognosis may be correct. Future Richard Steffels
confront a substantial dilemma. Although the Declaratory Judgment
Act was intended to apprise federal plaintiffs of the constitionality of
prospective conduct, article III requires sufficient past conduct to
create a justiciable controversy. If putative federal plaintiffs engage in
too much activity they may find themselves prosecuted by the state; if
they engage in too little, sufficient threat of prosecution may not exist
to create a viable case or controversy under article III. The result may
be the deterrence of constitutionally protected activity unless a flexible
view of the case and controversy requirement is taken. 58
Another factor exacerbates this dilemma. The Court in Steffel re-
manded the case to the district court to determine whether subsequent
events in Southeast Asia had altered the plaintiff's desire to handbill. 59
If the plaintiff had lost interest, a justiciable controversy would no
longer exist. Thus, the Court made its view clear that the justiciability
57. 415 U.S. at 476 (Stewart, J., concurring).
58. A rigid construction of article III requirements will place a putative federal
plaintiff in precisely the dilemma which proponents of the Declaratory Judgment Act
sought to avoid. In testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee on behalf of
declaratory judgment legislation, Professor Borchard indicated that the choice be-
tween foregoing constitutionally protected rights and facing criminal prosecution for
violation of an unconstitutional state statute was untenable under a "civilized legal
system." He found that "[t] he court, in effect, by refusing an injunction informs
the prospective victim that the only way to determine whether the suspect is a mush-
room or a toad stool, is to eat it." Hearings on H.R. 5623 Before the Subcomm. of
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 75-76 (1928), quoted in
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. at 468 n.18.
Although in some circumstances the Court has taken a flexible approach to article
III problems, the elements necessary to demonstrate a genuine threat of prosecution
remain unclear. The abortion cases represent the least restrictive interpretation.
In those cases, the Court required only a likelihood of prosecution arising from
existing circumstances or reasonably likely acts. See Roe v. Wade, 413 U.S. 113, 127-
29 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). A similarly flexible attitude has
been reflected in other contexts. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)
(state statute proscribing teaching of the theory of evolution found unconstitutional
despite no pending prosecution and state's assurances that it would no longer enforce
the statute). But cf. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (challenge to unenforced
birth control statute not justiciable). However, in other circumstances the Court has
been less willing to expand justiciability requirements. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S.- 77 (1971) (injunction denied to a
group of black Chicago citizens on the ground that complaint, while claiming har-
assment under certain statutes, failed to allege requisite irreparable harm where
none of the plaintiffs had been arrested, charged, prosecuted or threatened with
prosecution); Preiser v. Newkirk, 95 S. Ct. 2330 (1975) (plaintiff's return to medium
security prison and lack of potential for recurrence of harm rendered petition for
declaratory and injunctive relief challenging the original transfer procedure moot).
59. 415 U.S. at 460.
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requirement must continue at all stages of the federal proceedings. 60
This conclusion has been subsequently relied upon by the Court in
remanding another declaratory judgment action on similar grounds.
In Ellis v. Dyson6' the Court iefused to examine the merits of a con-
stitutional attack on a Dallas, Texas, loitering ordinance because the
record suggested that the federal plaintiffs were no longer subject to a
grave threat of prosecution. Given the protracted process of judicial
review, the continuing controversy requirement may effectively fore-
close a putative plaintiff from vindicating his constitutional rights in a
federal forum.
2. Superseding state action
In addition to article III problems, another factor reinforces Justice
Stewart's prognosis in Steffel. Under Steffel and its progeny, the fed-
eral plaintiff must also contend with state action commenced after the
declaratory judgment complaint is filed. While this obstacle clearly
exists, its magnitude remains unclear. The Court in Samuels v.
Mackell did not indicate what effect a federal court should give to a
state action commenced after a federal complaint is filed.62 The deci-
sion's underlying rationale, however, could be read to suggest that the
federal court should invariably dismiss the action; continued litigation
coincidental with state proceedings would represent an intrusion
under principles of federalism and comity whether the state action
began before or after the federal one. 63 This is precisely the conclu-
60. The Court indicated that "[t] he rule in federal cases is that an actual con-
troversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint
is filed." Id. at 459 n.10. See also Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969).
61. 421 U.S. 426 (1975). In Ellis, the state defendants (plaintiffs in the subse-
quent federal action) were arrested in January, 1972, and tried in Municipal Court
the following month under the challenged ordinance. They were found guilty and
fined $10 each. Id. at 428. After the 10-day period for review in the state court sys-
tem had expired, they filed a federal action under civil rights statutes and the Declara-
tory Judgment Act. The federal district court dismissed the case in December, 1972.
358 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Tex. 1972). The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
affirmed without an opinion in April, 1973. 475 F.2d 1402 (5th Cir. 1973). Certiorari
was granted in April, 1974, following Steffel. The Supreme Court's reversal of the
district court's dismissal and remand of the case occurred in May, 1975. During
argument, counsel for appellant admitted that they had not seen their clients for
months and did not know their whereabouts. 421 U.S. at 434.
62. The Court explicitly limited its holding to situations where the state action
had been commenced prior to the federal complaint. See text accompanying note 29
supra.
63. This conclusion illustrates the problem with articulating a "bright line" test
purportedly based upon a balancing of competing factors. See Part IV infra.
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sion reached by Justice Rehnquist in his concurrence in Steffel.64
Language in the majority opinion in Steffel, however, suggested that
the time of filing should determine the viability of the federal remedy.
The Court stated:65
When no state criminal proceeding is pending at the time the federal
complaint is filed, federal intervention does not result in duplicative
legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system; nor
can federal intervention, in that circumstance, be interpreted as re-
flecting negatively upon the state court's ability to enforce constitu-
tional principles.
Presumably, then, the state prosecutor cannot foreclose the federal
forum once a declaratory judgment complaint is filed.
The Court has subsequently indicated that the time of filing is not
determinative and that the state possesses the power to preempt the
federal plaintiff. In the recent case of Hicks v. Miranda,66 the Court
applied the Younger-Samuels test to federal plaintiffs who had not
been subjected to state criminal proceedings until after commence-
ment of the federal action. The Court held that state action could su-
persede a federal claim if it is filed "before any proceedings of sub-
stance on the merits have taken place in the federal action ....
Thus, under Hicks the state can preclude resort to a federal forum by
commencing proceedings after the federal claim is filed. While this
avoids the problem of a race to the courthouse, it imbues the state
prosecutor with power to manipulate principles of federalism and
64. Justice Rehnquist concluded: "For any arrest prior to the resolution of the
federal action would constitute a pending prosecution and bar declaratory relief
under the principles of Samuels." 415 U.S. at 480 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
65. 415 U.S. at 462 (emphasis added). This conclusion reflected Justice Bren-
nan's view previously articulated in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. at 104 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
66. 95 S. Ct. 2281 (1975). In Hicks, the federal plaintiffs had been joined in an
existing state prosecution one day after service of process for the declaratory judgment
and injunction had been made. The controversy stemmed from police seizure of the
film "Deep Throat" and the subsequent misdemeanor charges which were filed against
employees of the Pussycat Theatre where the film had been showing. The plaintiffs
in federal court were the owner of the theatre and the corporation in whose name
he was doing business.
67. Id. at 2292. In reviewing existing precedent the Court stated: "Neither Steffel
v. Thompson ... nor any other case in this Court has held that for Younger v.
Harris to apply, the state-criminal proceedings must be pending on the day the fed-
eral case is filed. Indeed, the issue has been left open ...." Id. But see text accom-
panying note 65 supra. Justice Stewart, in dissent, strongly disagreed with the Court's
holding. He concluded that the ruling in Hicks "trivializes" the Steffel holding. Id. at
2294. (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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comity to operate exclusively in his favor.68 Consequently, the reci-
procity inherent in the concepts of comity and federalism is violated.
3. The effects of a declaratory judgment
The viability of a declaratory judgment for future plaintiffs will
also depend on the judicial effect of the remedy. While Justice Bren-
nan's majority opinion left this issue open,69 the concurring opinions
of Justices White and Rehnquist reflect differing attitudes of the Court
regarding the res judicata effect of a declaratory judgment. These dif-
ferences are significant in two contexts: First, when a state tribunal is
confronted with a declaratory judgment and asked to give it some ef-
fect; and second, when a federal court is asked to issue an injunction
based on the result of a declaratory judgment proceeding.
In attempting to clarify the tortuous path of the Court in the area
of anticipatory relief, Justice Rehnquist stated:70
A declaratory judgment is simply a statement of rights, not a binding
order supplemented by continuing sanctions. State authorities may
choose to be guided by the judgment of a lower federal court, but they
are not compelled to follow the decision by threat of contempt or
other penalties.
Thus, any effect of a declaratory judgment is only by way of stare de-
cisis and not res judicata according to Justice Rehnquist's approach,
and such a remedy will neither support a subsequent injunction issued
by a federal court nor dismissal of a suit in state court. 71
68. Justice Stewart made this point in dissent:
The Court's new rule creates a reality which few state prosecutors can be ex-
pected to ignore. It is an open invitation to state officials to institute state proceed-
ings in order to defeat federal jurisdiction. . . . Today's opinion virtually in-
structs state officials to answer federal complaints with state indictments ...
The doctrine of Younger v. Harris reflects an accommodation of competing
interests. The rule announced today distorts that balance beyond recognition.
Id. at 2296 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
69. Justice Brennan, quoting extensively from his opinion in Perez, carefully
avoided articulating specific effects to be given a declaratory judgment. Thus he
stated: "[T] he declaration does not necessarily bar prosecutions under the [chal-
lenged] statute, as a broad injunction would." 415 U.S. at 470. He concluded, how-
ever: "[T] he federal court judgment may have some res judicata effect, though this
point is not free from difficulty ..... Id.
70. Id. at 482 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
71. Id. Justice Rehnquist distinguished between the effects to be given in a federal
court and in a state court, however:
[T] he federal decision would not be accorded the stare decisis effect in state
court that it would have in a subsequent proceeding within the same federal
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Justice White, also concurring in Steffel, responded to Justice
Rehnquist's opinion, and argued that a declaratory judgment should
be afforded the same res judicata effects as any final judgment on the
merits of the controversy.72 Thus, a federal plaintiff could obtain
immunity from prosecution under a state law which had been de-
clared unconstitutional. While Justice White did not explicitly con-
clude that an injunction could be subsequently issued based on the
declaratory judgment, he strongly intimated that the Act itself and
prior judicial interpretations of it would support such a conclusion.73
The Declaratory Judgment Act coupled with the potentially deleter-
ious implications of Justice Rehnquist's approach militate for adop-
tion of Justice White's analysis. First, the plain language of the Act
provides: "any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a
final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."74 This lan-
guage clearly suggests, and has been interpreted to mean, that a de-
claratory judgment does have res judicata effects. 75 Second, the conse-
quence of Justice Rehnquist's approach would be to make a declara-
tory judgment an advisory opinion, a result precluded from the scope
jurisdiction. Although the state court would not be compelled to follow the
federal holding, the opinion might, of course, be viewed as highly persuasive.
Id. at 482 n.3.
72. Id. at 477 (White, J., concurring).
73. Id.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). See note 26 and accompanying text supra. Professor
Borchard, an early proponent of the Act, explained the intended effect as follows:
Its declaratory, determinative, and adjudicatory function is its distinctive char-
acteristic .... [1It is the fact that it constitutes an official, final, binding, and un-
challengeable declaration of the rights of the parties constituting res judicata,
which gives it its character in the judicial process.
E. BORCHARD, DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS 10-11 (2d ed. 1941). See also Note, The
Res Judicata Effect of Declaratory Relief in the Federal Courts, 46 S. CAL. L. REV.
803 (1973).
75. See, e.g., Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1970), where Justice Black
stated that if a state prosecution is initiated subsequent to a federal declaration that
the statute which serves as the basis for the state proceedings is unconstitutional, a
federal plaintiff could seek and be entitled to an injunction under 28 U.S.C. § 2202
(1970). Justice Douglas, in his dissenting opinion in Mitchell v. Donovan, 398 U.S.
427, 432 (1970), treated injunctive and declaratory relief as having equal and final
force. Under his analysis, the Court in Mitchell would have been required to extend
the direct review provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) to a denial of a declaratoryjudgment by a three-judge district court, as well as 'to a denial of an injunction. As
the Court stated in Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952):
Is the declaration contemplated here to be res judicata, so that the [state court]
cannot hear evidence and decide any matter for itself? If so, the federal court
has virtually lifted the case out of the State [court] before it could be heard.
If not, the federal judgment serves no useful purpose as a final determination of
rights.
Id. at 247.
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of federal judicial power by article III of the Constitution.76 Finally,
Justice Rehnquist's analysis would also be dysfunctional to a mean-
ingful concept of federalism. The state's power to disregard the fed-
eral court's opinion would mean that considerations of comity and
federalism would run only in one direction, i.e., federal courts would
defer to state courts, but not vice versa.77
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's recent decisions concerning anticipatory re-
lief from prosecution under an allegedly unconstitutional state statute
confront a prospective plaintiff with a maze of differing prerequisites
which must be met to vindicate his constitutional claim in a federal
forum. The Court has continued to articulate the need to balance the
plaintiffs interests with principles of equity, comity and federalism.
Yet in applying this balancing approach, it has in fact introduced a
definitional test which depends on whether a state prosecution is
"pending." This approach not only avoids examining fundamental
issues as to the nature and effect of declaratory and injunctive reme-
dies, but, as Hicks illustrates, it introduces other problems which fur-
ther confuse these issues. Certainly, the issues glossed over in Steffel-
article III problems, the question of superseding state action, and res
judicata considerations-affect principles of equity, comity and feder-
alism. The Court should consider these issues before determining the
final balance. Until the Court does so, however, counsel for a federal
plaintiff seeking anticipatory relief must chart a careful course be-
76. The rule against advisory opinions is embedded in our history as well as in
the policies of separation of powers implicit in article III. See 3 H. JOHNSTON, THE
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486-89 (1891) (correspondence
between Secretary of State Jefferson and Chief Justice Jay); Alabama v. Arizona,
291 U.S. 286, 291 (1934); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
77. At least one commentator has agreed with Justice Rehnquist, however. See
Comment, Steffel v. Thompson: Federal Declaratory Relief and the State Criminal
Process-A Compromise of Comity and Primacy, 9 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REV. 87, 108
(1974). The author argues that Justice White's approach would "bootstrap" injunc-
tive relief without the requisite showing of bad faith harassment. The net result
presumably would be an impermissible intrusion in violation of comity principles.
The fallacy of this argument is that it presupposes that a declaratory judgment will
be ineffective without a subsequent injunction. As Justice Brennan has pointed out,
however, even with uncertain res judicata effects, a declaratory judgment can have a
profound effect on state officials and lead to a reassessment of their position vis-a-vis
the federal plaintiff. See 415 U.S. at 470-71.
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tween the Scylla of Dombrows ki and Younger and the Charybdis of
Samuels and Steffel.
Bobbe Jean Ellis
ERRATUM
1. Footnote 149 of School Finance in Washington-The North-
shore Litigation and Beyond, 50 WASH. L. REv. 853, 887 (1975), by
William R. Andersen, should read: "Justice Weaver added a short con-
curring opinion of his own."
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